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Financial accounting:
IS IFRS BRINGING HIGHER
REPORTING QUALITY TO
THE TABLE?
Prof.dr. Philip Joos: In order to understand
whether IFRS-based financial reports are of higher
quality compared to reports using local (or domes-
tic) accounting standards (Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles or GAAP), I briefly discuss the
genesis and growing popularity of IFRS. IFRS rules
are issued by the International Accounting Stan-
dards Board (IASB), an independent standard set-
ting body based in London consisting of 14 mem-
bers, who come from 9 different countries and have
a variety of functional backgrounds. The IASB in its
current form was created in 2001 as a successor of
the IASC, an institute created in 1973. The IASB co-
operates with national accounting standard-setters
to achieve convergence in accounting standards
around the world and eventually move toward one
single set of standards.
In Europe, all publicly listed companies have been
mandated to adopt IFRS since 2005, and worldwide
more than 100 countries adopt these global stan-
dards. The adoption by more than 7000 publicly lis-
ted firms in the EU was a big boost in the popularity
of IFRS in the world. In June 2002, the Council of
Ministers of the European Union approved a regula-
tion proposed by the European Commission in early
2001 to mandate IFRS for fiscal years beginning on
or after January 1, 2005. The EU previously had is-
sued accounting directives (4thand 7th) to harmonize
accounting standards within its boundaries, lea-
ving the interpretation and implementation to its
member states. Significant differences in rules kept
existing between countries, and were considered a
failure of the European accounting harmonization
attempt. Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer, Riedl (2007)
find significant positive stock market responses to
events that increased the likelihood of IFRS adop-
tion in Europe, consistent with investors in Europe-
an firms perceiving that benefits of IFRS, relative to
continuing using local GAAP, would exceed any ex-
pected implementation costs.
Another key event in the acceptance of IFRS as a
global standard is the decision by the US Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) on November 15,
2007 to allow foreign registrants in the US to file
IFRS-based financial statements without reconcilia-
tion to US GAAP. In addition, the US SEC organized
in December 2007 a round table discussion on the
use of IFRS by US domestic firms. The recent move
of the US towards IFRS finds its roots in the 1990s
when the IASC generated its core set of accounting
standards. The US has been keeping a close eye on
IFRS developments and its adoption throughout the
world.
There are at least three reasons why the US is
considering implementing IFRS. First, many US
companies are currently using IFRS for all of their
non-US operations and subsidiaries, and they have
essentially been reconciling their results to US
GAAP to comply with SEC requirements. Second, in
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These days the great debate among
users and preparers of financial
reports is whether the set of
International Financial Reporting
Standards (hereafter IFRS) is the
mana from heaven that brings
greater comparability, reliability and
relevance compared. Does financial
reporting quality really improve after
adopting IFRS? If so, should one
single set of global accounting
standards be used in today’s global
capital markets? In this article, I will
discuss a framework to analyze
financial reporting quality and provide









a move to diversify investment risk, many US insti-
tutional and retail investors own foreign stock. The
global integration of capital markets together with
transatlantic stock exchange mergers (such as NYSE
and Euronext) makes investing in foreign stocks
asier. As a result, US investors are increasingly
more interested in and familiar with the IFRS-based
reports published by the foreign firms they invest
in. Third, the US SEC analyzed the global experien-
ce of transitioning to IFRS, especially in the EU.
Consistent with the findings by Armstrong et al.
(2007), both preparers and users of financial reports
seem to have an overall positive experience with the
move toward IFRS, supporting the SEC to consider
IFRS instead of US GAAP. Clearly, one could not
have imagined that possibility a few years ago. It
seems that IFRS is on its way to become the most
important – not to say the single – set of accounting
standards in the world.
How different is IFRS from local GAAP?
IFRS differs from local GAAPs across the world along
two main dimensions: how economic transactions
are recognized on the balance sheet and income
statement, and how details on transactions are dis-
closed in the footnotes of the financial reports.
Academics label these as the measurement and disclosure
aspects of accounting standards.
Measurement differences between IFRS and
other GAAPs relate for example to accounting for
revenue recognition, R&D capitalization versus ex-
pensing, goodwill measurement and impairment,
restructuring expenses and discontinued opera-
tions. Up to 2008, foreign firms listed in the US
were required to disclose these measurement diffe-
rences between local GAAP and US GAAP in their re-
ports filed to the US SEC. The conversion to US GAAP
sometimes resulted in local GAAP profit numbers
turning into US GAAP losses, simply as a result of
different accounting principles. For example, Ahold
reported for fiscal year 2004 (respectively 2005) a
consolidated net loss of -436 million euro under
Dutch GAAP, a profit of +885 (+133 in 2005) million
under IFRS, and +89 million (-9 in 2005) under US
GAAP. A distinctive feature of IFRS is that it empha-
sizes the use of fair value accounting (as opposed to
historical cost accounting) in many instances, such
as impairments of long-lived assets and goodwill,
financial instruments, and share-based payments.
Opponents of IFRS blame the unverifiable nature of
some fair value numbers (such as impairments) as a
major source of earnings management and therefo-
re reducing the quality and reliability of IFRS ac-
counting figures (Ramanna, 2008).
Another key feature of IFRS is its emphasis on
detailed footnote disclosures. The motivation for
this is to give the user of the financial report in-
sight into the ‘accounting recipe book’, i.e. how
earnings and balance sheet numbers are computed.
Additionally, footnote information sheds light on
off-balance sheet information (e.g., pension assets
and liabilities) and relevant business information
(e.g., segment information, litigation, share-based
compensation, related-party transactions). IFRS
substantially increases the disclosure burden com-
pared to local GAAP (except for US GAAP).
Does IFRS increase reporting quality?
IFRS is often claimed to be a high-quality reporting
standard. Measuring financial reporting quality
has been the focus of many academic studies in the
last two decades. However, there is no universally
accepted definition for reporting quality. Quality is
defined in the eyes of the beholder. I illustrate this
fact with the following example. Several years ago,
a well-known German car manufacturer exported
its high-quality cars to the US. It ignored the fact
that US customers expect high-quality cars to have
large (and many) coffee cup holders. The sleek look
and high-performance engines were not enough to
please US customers. European luxury car buyers
use a different quality definition than their US
counterparts: US drivers prefer to take a big mug of
Starbucks coffee in their car and drink it at a diffe-
rent location than the coffee shop.
Reporting quality applies to two dimensions of
reporting: accounting measurement and footnote dis-
closures, as illustrated in figure 1. As with the Ger-
man car example, the features of these two quality
dimensions are differently valued across the world
and across different financial statement user and
preparer groups.
The first dimension of reporting quality relates
to footnote disclosures. IFRS mandates more informa-
tion to be disclosed in footnotes. It is not surprising
that annual reports under IFRS are significantly
lengthier compared to the pre-IFRS reports. Goh,
Joos and Soonawalla (2008) investigate the quality
of the footnote disclosures on share-based payment
(IFRS 2) in the EU, and find that not all firms com-
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ply with the mandatory IFRS disclosures. For exam-
ple, some French firms choose to provide less infor-
mation than required, especially with respect to the
inputs of the stock option valuation method. A lack
of education, training, and knowledge of IFRS
might be playing a role, especially for the smaller
firms. On the other hand, some firms disclose a
level of detail that goes beyond what is mandated.
The next section explains why inter-firm differen-
ces in reporting quality exist.
With respect to the second dimension of repor-
ting – accounting measurement – academics generally
agree that earnings numbers from the income
statement in high-quality regimes are more infor-
mative (about a firm’s risk and value), more volatile
or more difficult to predict, and more conservative.
Lastly, IFRS adoption results in greater corporate
transparency that affects stock return synchronici-
ty. I will discuss some recent academic work docu-
menting effects of IFRS adoption on quality of ac-
counting measurement.
1 Value relevance of accounting information
Value relevance research provides insights into ques-
tions of interest to standard setters and other non-
academic constituents (Barth, Beaver and Lands-
Figure 1.
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E.g. Single market program in EU to
stimulate cross-border competition, labor,
capital and product exchange
‘The quality of financial reporting
is influenced by economic, private,
and political forces’
Lobbying
man 2001). One expects firms that with higher qua-
lity accounting have a higher association between
stock prices and earnings and book values of equity,
because these amounts better reflect a firm’s under-
lying economics. Greater value relevance is also re-
flected in less opportunistic managerial discretion,
and in less non-opportunistic estima-tion error of
accruals (i.e., difference between earnings and ope-
rating cash flows). In a recent study, Barth, Lands-
man and Lang (2008) investigate 327 firms taken
from 21 countries that adopted IFRS in the period
1994-2003, and checked whether accounting value
relevance of earnings and book value of equity in-
creased after IFRS adoption. Their empirical eviden-
ce supports the increase in accounting quality, sug-
gesting IFRS is of higher quality than local GAAP.
2 Earnings volatility
As indicated in the previous section, a distinctive
feature of IFRS is its use of fair value accounting as
opposed to the historical cost method. As a result of
adopting IFRS, earnings are expected to become
more volatile (less smoothing), reflecting better the
volatility of the underlying economics. Recent re-
search suggests that timely recognition of gains
and losses, which is consistent with higher ear-
nings quality, tends to increase the volatility of ear-
nings relative to cash flows. In addition, the fre-
quency of large losses is also expected to increase
(for example, due to fair-value based impairments).
Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008) report a 21% in-
crease in variability of earnings changes in the
post-IFRS period for firms volantarily adopting
IFRS. Beuselinck, Joos and Vander Meulen (2007)
show a high degree of earnings smoothing in the
early 1990s in the EU, a phenomenon consistent
with opportunistic earnings management and
lower volatility of earnings. Firms tend to smooth
earnings less in more recent periods, even before
the mandatory adoption of IFRS.
3 Earnings conservatism
High quality earnings exhibit a high degree of con-
servatism, i.e., an asymmetric degree of verifiabili-
ty of losses versus profits (Watts, 2003). For exam-
ple, when managers expect future cash flows to be
negative, they will reflect their (negative) informa-
tion in an impairment charge, without the need to
wait until the future negative cash flows are reali-
zed. However, when future cash flows are expected
to be positive (e.g., because a patent is obtained by
a high-tech firm), then these future cash flows can
only be reflected in earnings when realized. Beuse-
linck, Joos and Vander Meulen (2007) document the
evolution of the degree of earnings conservatism in
14 EU countries in the period 1990-2006, and find
that earnings become generally more conservative,
even before the introduction of IFRS, except for ear-
nings reported by Greek and Portuguese firms.
Firms from these countries seem to smooth their
earnings and resist taking impairments, even after
the introduction of IFRS. The next section will furt-
her explain why some firms have more conservative
earnings than others.
4 Stock return synchronicity
A recent promising area of research focuses on a new
quality measure: stock return synchronicity (or the
inverse of synchronicity, namely firm-specific idio-
syncratic risk). Stock returns reflect new market-
level and firm-level information. The extent to
which stocks move together depends on the relative
amounts of firm-level and market-level information
capitalized into stock prices (Morck, Yeung and Yu,
2000). In more transparent environments, stock pri-
ces should be more informative about future events.
Consequently, when events actually happen in
the future, there should be less surprise, i.e. less
new information being impounded into the stock
price. Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2007) develop a sim-
ple model to show that stock return synchronicity
can increase when corporate transparency improves.
Beuselinck, Joos, Khurana and Vander Meulen
(2008) apply their model and investigate the syn-
chronicity pattern in a constant sample of 2173 firms
from 14 EU countries in the period 2003-2007,i.e.,
the period around the mandatory IFRS adoption year
2005. Figure 2 shows the pattern in the average Eu-
ropean stock return synchronicity (a logarithmic
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transformation of the R2 from a market model re-
gression) and indicates a significant in-crease after
the mandatory implementation of IFRS in 2005.
The increase in synchronicity is consistent with
the stock market investors learning much more
about the firms’ underlying economics and IFRS in-
formation being more informative about future
firm-specific events. The surprise components of
stock returns will be lower when stock returns are
disclosed. Greater stock return comovement is also
consistent with greater comparability of the finan-
cial reports under IFRS: information disclosed in
the annual report of an Italian car manufacturer
can better be compared with that of a French or Ger-
man car manufacturer, stimulating stock prices of
these firms to comove.
To summarize, adopting IFRS makes accounting
numbers more value relevant (especially under vol-
untary adoption), earnings more volatile, and pro-
motes higher transparency (or greater comparabili-
ty) as reflected in greater stock return synchronicity.
However, greater earnings conservatism and more
timely loss recognition started even before IFRS was
implemented in the EU, suggesting that other fac-
tors than only the IFRS standards play a role. The
next session further explains these other factors.
What factors explain reporting quality?
Why do firms have different earnings or disclosure
quality, and is IFRS per se able to improve quality? I
argue that quality of financial reporting is influenced
by three broad forces as illustrated in figure 1: econo-
mic, private, and political forces. The mix and inten-
sity of these forces generally differs across countries,
resulting in different perceptions of quality.
Political forces are broadly defined and relate to a
country’s or region’s government, tax authorities,
legal system, standard setting body, and law enforce-
ment effectiveness. To illustrate the influence of po-
litical forces on reporting, take book-tax conformity,
i.e., tax accounting corresponds with financial ac-
counting. When conformity is high, firms may want
to minimize taxes by choosing accounting policies
that minimize earnings. Earnings figures therefore
exhibit a specific pattern caused by political forces.
The adoption of IFRS in the EU was a political
decision affected by the Single Market program to
improve corporate transparency, which stimulates
in its turn capital mobility.
Figure 2.
Stock return synchronicity in Europe










From Beuselinck, Joos, Khurana and Vander Meulen
(2008), ‘IFRS and corporate transparency’, Tilburg
University working paper. The graph presents the time
evolution of the average log(R2/(1-R2)) in the EU15
(excluding Luxemburg), where R2 represents the
coefficient of determination of the following firm-
specific regression:
RETi,t = α + β1MARETi,t-1 + β2MARETi,t + β3INDRETi,t-1
+ β4INDRETi,t + εi,t,
where RET is the firm’s weekly stock return, MARET is
the return of the stock market index, and INDRET is the
return of the industry index to which the firm belongs.
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
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Since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the countries in
the EU have worked on an economic program to in-
tegrate product, labor and financial market. Econo-
mic forces therefore influence political forces. Beu-
selinck, Joos and Vander Meulen (2007) find that
earnings figures in most EU countries exhibit less
smoothing behavior over the period 1990-2006. The
finding is consistent with greater economic conver-
gence across the EU, with lower trade barriers,
high er competition, and high capital mobility.
Private forces consist of non-government related
stakeholders who care about a firm’s financial re-
ports, such as creditors, customers, suppliers, inves-
tors, labor unions, financial analysts and the press.
Each of these stakeholders demand a certain level of
reporting quality, and lobby with the government
for regulation. For example, Beuselinck, Joos and
Vander Meulen (2007) provide evidence of financial
analysts lowering earnings smoothing. In particu-
lar, even before the mandatory IFRS adop-tion in Eu-
rope, firms with high analyst following show more
timely loss recognition and less profit smoothing
during economic growth periods. The financial ana-
lyst effect is especially large in countries with a
strong enforcement mechanism and high investor
protection. Goh, Joos and Soonawalla (2008) find
that a higher level of institutional ownership and fo-
reign ownership stimulates better footnote disclosu-
re on share-based payment under IFRS 2. On the
other hand, greater family and CEO ownership ne-
gatively affect the quality of the IFRS 2 disclosures.
Finally, economic forces also influence the pri-
vate forces. For example, a firm’s management
might choose to manage earnings downward in
economic recession periods and smooth earnings in
economic expansion periods to facilitate negotia-
tions with labor unions. Reporting greater losses
during recession periods makes corporate restructu-
rings and layoffs easier.
Is one global accounting standard what we
really want?
Everybody recognizes that one language – a lingua
franca – has enormous advantages in promoting
human interaction. For example, English is used at
Dutch universities to attract more international
students and stimulate international exchange pro-
grams. But does that mean that all Dutch students
will only speak English? Many of the emotional ex-
pressions and the socio-cultural identity of a com-
munity are reflected in its language, and English is
not about to replace that throughout the world. The
same is true for the language of business, i.e., fi-
nancial reporting rules. Unless all demand factors
and political forces (as shown in figure 1) are identi-
cal, financial reporting will differ across the world.
In the current trend to promote IFRS as the global
accounting standard, we run the risk of having a
false impression of financial reporting uniformity.
Accounting choices, interpretation and enforce-
ment of IFRS remain different across firms from dif-
ferent countries. Although IFRS might have elimi-
nated the apples-oranges problem when comparing
firms from different countries, it is still the case
that apples taste different when grown on apple
trees planted in different soil.
Conclusion
Clearly, the rapidly expanding use of IFRS satisfies
the reporting demand of internationally active mul-
tinational firms, investors and auditors. Multinatio-
nal firms enjoy a lower cost of capital, institutional
and private investors can better diversify their port-
folios, and big four audit firms can expand their cus-
tomer base by using their IFRS expertise. However,
there are also losers in the reporting game. Smaller
firms with a regional focus experience an increase in
the reporting burden without clear benefits. Poor
compliance with IFRS by smaller firms might even
result in a higher cost of capital. Since many of the
political (tax authority, courts, securities exchange
watchdog, etc.) and private forces (labor unions,
banks, customers) are organized at the local or regio-
nal level as opposed to a global level, it is questiona-
ble whether IFRS succeeds in bringing universal
high quality reporting and comparability across the
world. We may end up with strong local dialects of
this global business language.
In order for IFRS to promote higher reporting
quality in the world, there are several challenges to
overcome. First, given the emphasis on fair values
and the much greater complexity of IFRS, it is key
that users and preparers of financial reports under-
stand the foundation of economics, finance, portfo-
lio pricing and valuation. Second, greater economic
and political convergence will create incentives for
more compliance with the principles of IFRS. Users
of financial reports also need to be aware of the re-
porting incentives of corporate managers, incenti-
ves that vary across countries. Finally, given the re-
‘There is no universally
accepted definition for
reporting quality’
cent creation of enforcement institutions in many
countries, it is key to ensure consistent enforce-
ment of IFRS across all countries.
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